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Having arrived in Jamaica as one of the Special Magistrates sent from England to 
oversee the passing of the 1833 Emancipation Act, Richard Madden observed that,  
the late change which has taken place in the condition of the negro 
population of these islands, must necessarily lead to great alterations in 
the mode of managing plantations. It requires as little knowledge of 
human nature, as of political economy, to be assured that no man will 
labour without reward, who can avoid it. Hitherto, coercion was 
necessarily employed to obtain labour; but the new law, in making 
coercion the legal penalty of its infraction, instead of an arbitrary 
punishment, summarily inflicted, has deprived it of the character which 
chiefly constituted its terrors; for nothing, I apprehend, can be more 
productive of terror than the power of inflicting punishment in the heat 
of passion. That stimulus to labour is therefore in the hands of the 
special justice, not what it was in those of the overseer. In some cases 
in four years, in others in six years, it will not exist at all. In the 
intermediate time conciliation, to a great extent must be looked to, to 
effect what coercion formerly did.1  
Madden’s reflections function as a vivid reminder of the ways in which instrumental 
economic imperative, imperial interest, and colonial fantasies about appropriate 
colonial subjectivity framed official interpretations of slave emancipation. If 
‘freedom’ was something to be bequeathed in such a way that labour productivity 
would continue uninterrupted, a key question concerned the relocation of the 
 124 
‘stimulus to labour’. If the arbitrary forms of terror associated with a privately-owned 
labour force had previously ensured steady work, now – and until such time as it was 
no longer required – it would be secured institutionally, through a penal framework 
administered by colonial agents. The ‘great change’ that would nevertheless ensure 
productive continuity was thus to be achieved by the imperial state taking over the 
direction of labour. During the period of state-administered labour discipline, or 
‘apprenticeship’, Madden supposes that sentiment will play its part. The fact that he 
notes that a conciliation needs to be secured in order for the Caribbean plantations to 
survive and prosper perhaps hints at a long-held colonial anxiety that perhaps things 
might not work out. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, Madden’s reflections about a possible conciliation 
between masters and workers leads him to eulogise about the success of Mathew 
Lewis’s so-called enlightened plantership in 1815 and 1817 instead of any earlier 
experiment in ‘freeing’ the enslaved. Lewis had (reluctantly) inherited two 
plantations, and he when he arrived in Jamaica in 1815 he found his properties in 
disarray, and his six hundred slaves on the verge of rebellion. According to his 
account of his experience, he spent his time, and definitely extremely nervously, 
attempting to re-establish his paternalistic sovereignty over his bondsmen and women. 
Like so many other colonial reformers, he cast the project of reinforcing labour 
hierarchies as an effort in ‘conciliation’ between himself and his workforce. He 
developed management techniques that were designed to restore productive order by 
eliciting the appropriately subordinating sentiments of his labourers: gratitude, 
contentment, and dutiful loyalty. Lewis introduced a system of petty rewards, 
abolished the use of the whip in the field, and the flogging of enslaved women, 
allowing Saturdays as free time, and instituted an annual ‘royal holiday’.2 The 
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ameliorative measures seemed to have been successful as Madden reports that 
Lewis’s heir, his nephew, has recently confirmed that the plantations are now 
flourishing amongst so many others that have gone to the wall. As a result, Madden 
enthusiastically pronounces, ‘By [Lewis’s] two visits he saved his properties!’ 
Thus, at the moment of emancipation, Madden looks back in order to look 
forward, rehabilitating Lewis (who had never countenanced freeing his slaves) as a 
canny proprietor, sovereign protector, and as an exemplary authority on, or an 
innovator in, labour management. His exclamation – as an avowed anti-slavery 
supporter and committed (if albeit institutionalised) activist who was to become a 
fierce and effective critic of the apprenticeship arrangements - resonates across the 
history of the abolition campaigns for a variety of reasons that are central to this 
chapter. Firstly, it is a reminder that, for the elite abolitionists, the arguments for 
ending slavery was almost always framed with a goal of maintaining the colonial 
plantation complex. Secondly, it registers the importance of continuing labour 
discipline to both abolitionists and planters. Thirdly, it identifies the particular terms 
within which abolitionists took up the argument for ‘free labour’ as offered 
theoretically by political economy and which Madden takes for granted as a certain 
form of ‘common sense’.3 
The nature, extent, and wider impact of the analysis of slavery embedded in 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century classical political-economic writings have 
been subjects of recent debate amongst critics and historians.4 The apparent dearth of 
sustained attention to the fact that a peculiarly modern form of slavery was flourishing 
in the very belly of commercial society has been explained as an effect of the 
vigorously progressive thrust of the political economic narrative. As Walter Johnson 
notes, it is possible to generalise to the point at which one can say that ‘bourgeois’ 
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theories of political economy get off the ground through the foundational erasure of 
slavery because within their enlightened terms, slavery is, or should be, in some 
senses no longer thinkable.5  
Seymour Drescher adopts this view to argue that the limited, and ambivalent, 
discussion of slavery within the ‘new science’ meant that British abolitionism, in its 
search for outside authority, had found little of substance, or indeed of comfort, when 
formulating their campaigning arguments.6 That the ‘free labour’ argument remained 
muted amongst abolitionists stands if one tracks, as Drescher does, the fate of the 
most arresting axiom to do with the deployment of ‘labour’, articulated most 
famously by Adam Smith, as ‘the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end 
than that performed by slaves’.7 Abolitionists were indeed vulnerable when the axiom 
was mobilised in contexts that were either too particular or too general. On the one 
hand, in the cut and thrust of heated debate, both sides often reverted to the reductive 
idea that theoretical statement could be proved or disproved by contingent empirical 
evidence, most often at the abolitionist’s cost. On the other, the axiom was prone to 
losing the vital (and temporally ambiguous) Smithian qualifier of ‘in the end’, 
becoming an indefensibly sweeping assertion about the relative cheapness of two, 
historically unnuanced, forms of labour. On this basis, a discrete focus on the debate 
about the relative cheapness of ‘free’ or enslaved labour, as it waxed and waned from 
the 1780s through to the Emancipation Act, risks suggesting that when abolitionists 
championed the ‘efficiency’ and cheapness of so-called ‘free labour’ they were often 
simply mistaken, or that they were somehow insincere because they knew that they 
could not refute the empirical evidence, or that the argument about ‘free labour’ was 
less important to them than it sometimes appears. In this respect, Drescher’s detailed 
analysis of a discrete set of economic ideas about the stubborn profitability of 
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enslaved colonial labour, articulated at times by a limited number of abolitionists, 
readily supports his larger project of understanding abolition as a national ‘econocide’ 
committed in the name of moral humanitarianism.  
Drescher’s terms of the analysis obscure as much as they reveal, however, 
insofar as to focus on the role of Smith’s oft-repeated statement captures only one 
aspect of abolitionism’s shifting identification with political economy and its wider 
implications. Moreover, one of the consequences of the approach is to reduce the 
contingent historical processes by which the boundaries between different forms of 
labour could be drawn and redrawn, as well as the historical specificity of the ways in 
which the concepts of enslaved labour and ‘free labour’ were mobilised and 
understood, to particular, and different, contexts.  
Smith himself never doubted that the use of enslaved labour was profitable in 
the narrow sense of increasing the wealth of those who could arbitrarily exploit the 
weak with impunity. The reason why he was so interested in the issue was because it 
telegraphed the grander distinctions between self-interest and selfishness, liberty and 
license, and between natural markets and artificial ones. That is, it cut to the heart of 
his all-embracing theory of political economy founded on a theory of enlightened 
human nature. The problem with monopolies and slavery was that they contravened 
the natural link between freedom, self-interest and economic progress. Like Hume, 
Smith portrayed these abuses as harmful not simply because they were inefficient – 
indeed this problem did not seem to exist on the balance sheet of the slave-owner or 
the monopolist – but more importantly because they distorted the flow of goods and 
services in ways that hindered the long-term growth of the economy more generally.  
Smith noted that there was something ‘peculiar’ about the tropical non-
essential goods of tobacco, and especially sugar, but his criticism of the West India 
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planters reflects his more general attack, in The Wealth of Nations, on the propensities 
of merchants. Their monopolistic activities not only disrupt competitive price 
mechanisms, they also have deleterious effects on a merchant’s ‘character’, and 
hence, importantly, on the characters of labourers.8 For Smith, the most ‘fatal’ effect 
of vastly inflated mercantile profits is to destroy the (otherwise ‘natural’) ‘parsimony’ 
of the merchant who, as a necessary leader and ‘conductor of industry’ … ‘has a 
much greater influence upon the manners of the whole industrious part’ of every 
nation.9 That is to say, Smith’s comments are set within his all-embracing attack on 
the mercantile system: political economy, the study of the appropriate stabilisation of 
labour hierarchies in a commercial society, and moral sentiment, the philosophical 
reflection on the requisites of civility, are threaded through each other, and it is these 
issues rather than in an abstractly economic, or discretely financial, argument that 
energised and emboldened the early anti-slavery activists.  
From the very beginning, the condemnation of slavery was accompanied by 
imagining alternative forms of labour. As Christopher Brown has detailed, well before 
the formalisation of an anti-slave trade campaign, more elaborate plans had been 
developed that justified ending slavery with an eye to ensuring the continuing 
viability of the industrial plantation complex.10 By the 1780s, the two most influential 
abolitionist writers, James Ramsey and Thomas Clarkson, drew heavily on Smith’s 
wide-ranging, anti-mercantilist agenda in order to propose, not simply reforming 
Caribbean labour practices, but a reformation of the entire colonial system. 
Ramsey reflected Smith’s attention to the damage caused by unregulated 
labour relations when he attacked the political-economic foundation of the sugar 
industry. He argued that the ‘monopoly of the British market’ had created a 
particularly cruel group of planters because the high returns enabled absenteeism and 
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luxurious life-styles in the metropole. Because English planters were unrestrained by 
legal regulation, they were blind to the fact that their ‘true interest was on the side of 
liberty, and of moral improvement, not in niggardly pinching, not in stripes, chains, 
and nakedness’.11 
As Ryden notes, ‘in so many words Ramsey was putting forward a free-labour 
argument’ insofar as it would be cheaper and more efficient in a context free of 
Government subsidy and planter protection.12 By ending the slave trade, and 
promoting civilization in Africa, new advantageous trading opportunities would 
develop, while planters in the West Indies would be forced to reform themselves as a 
result of new market discipline. Ramsey’s Smithian arguments had a significant 
impact on the development of abolitionist rhetoric, especially on Thomas Clarkson 
who adopted the vision for a reformed Empire. Clarkson also highlighted the 
relationship between excessive mercantile wealth and deformations of character, 
arguing that planters should be compelled into more humane management. The 
efficiency of the slave trade meant that planters could work slaves to death, having no 
cause to nurture a natural population growth on their plantations. Not only was this 
utterly inhumane but the chasing of short-term profits had long-term negative effects 
on planters’ wealth. Clarkson also had a grand vision for the colonial system that 
included highlighting the alternative benefits of redirecting British shipping, and 
crucially from the economic development of Africa.13 For both men, the questions of 
why slavery persisted out of sight across the Atlantic, and of how it might be replaced 
successfully, i.e. profitably, by free labour, were to be answered by the long 
progressive arm of political economy, as it embraced, at this stage at least, 
psychology, morality, and geography. 
As Ramsey and Clarkson’s founding documents attest, that long progressive 
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arm was spatial but also temporal. The critique of slavery offered by the ‘science of 
man’ was embedded in a theory of historical development that saw slavery as a block 
to the economic logic of that development’s onward march. What was novel about the 
new approach, as Shilliam notes, was that slavery’s immorality was now conceived as 
a problem to be dealt with through the lexicon of commerce rather than common law. 
The shift changed the terms of the argument. Thus, for James Stuert, forced labour 
was a problem because it constrained wants.14 Similarly, Smith argued that, under 
slavery, human self-interest could not be activated under conditions of enslavement 
because workers derived no direct benefit from their own labour. As an inevitable 
result, they were less productive, and could only be governed by violence. These new, 
commercially oriented, assumptions, based on an enlightened understanding of the 
contours of universal human nature, helped to lever the so-called efficiency of free 
labour into a progressive theory of history but this did not necessarily mean that 
Scottish thinkers thought slavery’s endings would be the inevitable outcome of 
historical advance.  
Neither Smith, nor other writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, thought that 
slavery would disappear due to altered economic forces alone. On the basis of 
European exceptionality, slavery would continue to flourish unless political forces 
intervened directly to outlaw or dismantle it. Ramsey and Clarkson’s plans, however 
visionary, also paid close attention to the legal developments that would be necessary 
for a transformation of the terms of colonial production; the view remained central to 
the different and contingent scripts for how slavery could be ended, and the 
plantations secured, as Richard Madden’s view of emancipation in 1833 makes clear. 
If political intervention was required to steer the grand narrative of 
developmental history, the necessary re-fashioning of its various subjects was also at 
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issue. Smith had famously grounded his entire system on the idea that humanity was 
universally possessed of an innate capacity to truck, barter and exchange. But the kind 
of ‘freedoms’ conceptualised by the founding assumption did not easily capture the 
requirements made of enslaved colonial workers, who were most often conceived as a 
particular category of ‘labour’ rather than as individual agents. The famous ‘invisible 
hand’ of the market might have informed early plans for reforming the empire but that 
argument was conceived by Smith as part of his anti-colonial vision of the benefits of 
the freedom of commerce. It was to emerge again in the final emancipation debates 
but political economy did not offer much comfort for elite abolitionists who were 
thinking and arguing within the frame of ‘actually existing empire’ at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century.  
On the other hand, the developmental narrative helped to open up a space 
within which economic considerations justified the construction of colonial, cultural 
or racial inadequacy, and through which the coercion that underlay the discourse of 
freedom and reform could be glossed. Thus Africans and their Caribbean descendants 
could be viewed as incapable, or at least not yet capable, of participating fully in the 
economic revolution that was happening around them. This intellectual space was 
exploited by elite abolitionists who did not often argue from biological flaw but 
almost always from matters of errant, or uneven, history. Habits, attitudes, and social 
practices, understood to be antithetical to supporting a ‘free’ labour regime, were 
interpreted as the result of African ignorance and barbarity combined with generations 
of brutalizing enslavement.  
Thus the commitment to the promise of cheaper labour was inextricably bound 
to the question of labour discipline.15 The problem of plantation management – the 
problem of producing self-dependence and loyal servitude – exercised pro-slavery 
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supporters, anti-slavery advocates, and the Colonial Office. How could a self-
disciplined and self-reproducing labour force be created, one with the capacity to 
work willingly for someone else not simply as a matter of survival but in the belief 
that it was in their self-interest so to do? Abolitionists were thus deeply invested in the 
promise of political economy insofar as they took its universal humanism as their 
starting point. They were always interested in the internal dynamic, and character, of 
human motivation, the very basis of the Smithian argument, rather than simply being 
engaged with the nature of macroeconomic re-distribution. To note that abolitionists 
tended to put their number-crunching at the back of their campaigning pamphlets, 
underplays its intimate relationship to what filled so many pages at the front.16 Here, 
they devoted endless attention to identifying the ‘stimulus to labour’ under different 
conditions, and to providing ways of calibrating degrees of freedom and unfreedom so 
that colonial productivity could be preserved. 
It is perhaps ironic that, by taking up this aspect of political economy, 
abolitionism brought the question of slave agency to the forefront.17 By paying 
attention to the historical context within which the political-economic arguments 
about the necessary fate of slavery were elaborated, revised and repeated by 
abolitionists, manoeuvring as they were first against the slave trade and much later 
against the institution of slavery itself, we can begin to see the ways in which the 
resistance of the enslaved was a central concern for the abolitionists. They endlessly 
documented and catalogued and advertised such actions – the myriad of tactics and 
strategies such as slowing down, absconding, working in various forms outside the 
formal laws of enslavement, rebelling – in their efforts to prove that the institution 
was inefficient precisely because it made the enslaved recalcitrant.  
In The Mighty Experiment, Drescher notes the negative impact of the Haitian 
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revolution and the anti-slave trade debates on the abolitionists’ willingness to use 
arguments about the economic rationality of ‘free labour’.18 He points out that in 1802 
James Stephen, ‘the “Saints’” most informed and authoritative expert on the 
Caribbean’, publically stated his ‘clear conviction, that such cheapness of labour is by 
no means to be expected from the voluntary industry, however great, of negroes in a 
state of freedom, as now excites the enterprise and splendidly rewards the success of 
the planter, in places where slavery is established.’19 Stephen made the statement in a 
lengthy pamphlet about the revolution in St. Domingue in 1802 but in the context of a 
discussion of the future development of Britain’s recent imperial acquisition, 
Trinidad. Stephen’s ‘conviction’ needs to be seen in the wider context of these plans 
insofar as they illustrate the terms in which he envisions a reformed labour system, 
and various roles that forcibly acquired Africans might play in the aid to the imperial 
wartime state.  
Stephen reflects the benefits that will stem from banning the importation of 
enslaved Africans, and introducing new forms of labour management in the colony. 
He acknowledges that the dip in profits would be the chief objection to implementing 
his vision but notes that ‘short-sighted avarice’ would be replaced by the 
establishment of ‘a firm and tranquil dominion’ where planters’ gains would be ‘more 
uniform and infinitely more secure’.20 If a ‘more liberal policy’ was adopted, he 
argued, speculation would make the settlement prosper. Moreover, the extensive 
availability of land for provisioning, extremely fertile soils, with a particular amenity 
to new technology, would sustain a labour force that would become, via their wages, 
avid consumers of British goods, giving in turn a fillip to British shipping.21 
Stephen’s plan is founded, however, on indenturing the first ‘free Negroes’ within a 
heavily legalistic, metropolitan-based set of structures that would require Special 
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Magistrates, the maintenance of a formal punishment system, wages to be determined 
by law, and banning of the whip. This nascent ‘apprenticeship system’ was to be 
installed precisely because ‘that bane of moral character in the slave is utterly 
inconsistent with the happy formation of a new system, as well as with the effectual 
reformation of the old’.22 Enslaved Africans were ‘ricketty infants’ who must be 
‘taught how to walk’.23 
Africans who had not yet experienced work under slave condition were 
understood to be suited to another sort of disciplinary regime. Stephen advocates the 
purchase of kidnapped Africans to replenish the military presence in the West Indies, 
arguing that their able-bodied nature, their ‘yet unbroken spirit’, and their attachment 
to the ‘government that had redeemed them from captivity’, would make them 
‘excellent defenders against the hostile attempts of France’. Of the ‘fidelity’ of ‘armed 
negroes’, he assures his readers, there can be no ‘reasonable doubt; for the cause of 
Great Britain would be their own’.24 Stephen’s lengthy justification for re-allocating 
of African labour via state-managed indentureships and direct purchase were made in 
the specific context of Britain’s efforts against the French. They were rationalised in 
the name of a future economic prosperity but also with an eye to eliciting imperial 
identification and stability. The combination of indentured servitude and military 
impressment as appropriate alternative roles for Africans who would be otherwise 
enslaved would become part of the Act to abolish the British Slave Trade in 1807, 
also authored, in great part, by Stephen. 
The 1807 Act legislated for the destiny of the Africans seized from illegally 
operating slave ships in the context of imperial war. They would be either enlisted 
into the British military forces, or indentured, as ‘apprentices’, for a maximum of 
fourteen years.25 These measures, or indeed the Africans themselves, were not 
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represented in the celebratory memorabilia marking the humanitarian triumph of 
1807. Perceptions of their fate, however, helped to shape the ‘war of representation’ 
being fought over different forms of labour in ways that became increasingly difficult 
for the parliamentary abolitionists to counter.26 The fact that the anti-slave trade 
legislation, and the administrative structures and practices of slave trading and 
slavery, were intimately related, consistently embarrassed the African Institution in 
the early years of suppression, eliciting sustained controversy in the colonies on both 
sides of the Atlantic and in London.27  
The pro-slavery lobby opportunistically appropriated the radical attacks on the 
evangelical conservatism associated with the development of Sierra Leone to the 
point where parliamentary abolitionists had to admit the limitations of the Abolition 
Act. They stressed that the constraining terms of rescue had been devised as 
protective measures for the benefit of the Africans themselves. Their rationale had 
either to do with the African’s ‘ignorance’, meaning that it had been ‘necessary in 
respect of them to give for their own sakes the power of enlisting or apprenticing’ or 
to prevent the possibility of re-enslavement once disembarked in the sugar colonies.28  
Abolitionists were strangely silent about the thousands of Africans 
appropriated for the military during the Napoleonic wars, despite the fact that the 
policy had formed part of James Stephen’s 1802 plan. 29 By 1823, however, in a long 
pamphlet championing various exemplary instances of colonial improvement, 
Thomas Clarkson was explaining that the African soldiers, since 1819, when the 
regiments had been disbanded, had ‘conducted themselves with great propriety’ both 
in Sierra Leone and in the West Indies. The army, he argued, needed to be seen, 
therefore, as an ideal ‘preparatory school’. Because the Africans were ‘never out of 
reach of discipline’, they had been ‘fitted … by degrees for making good use of their 
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liberty’.30 
Before 1815, the majority of captives returned to Sierra Leone or the West 
Indies were enlisted to fight for the imperial interest. Those deemed ‘unfit’ for 
military service were indentured, providing a new source of bound and disciplined 
labour for the colonies. This decision can also be traced to Stephen, and also Zacharay 
Macaulay. Macaulay had struggled with the original settlers of Sierra Leone as they 
refused to submit to the strict paternalist discipline required by company rule.31 The 
mobility of the settlers frustrated him more than anything else. He complained that it 
was ‘impossible to subject them to regular instruction’ unless some way of correcting 
their ‘migratory habits’ could be found.32 His experiences leant weight to the idea that 
some measure of ‘constraint’ should be written into the anti-slave-trade regulations. 
While Stephen, the other principle architect of the Bill, was concerned about the lack 
of detail and discrimination in the final document, Wilberforce defended the 
exploitative measures as ‘the least objectionable way of rescuing slaves’, a phrase that 
abolitionists would continue to use throughout the campaign when justifying the 
policy.33  
Perhaps it is unsurprising that the legal terms of rescue written into the Slave 
Trade Act drew a thin veil between enslavement and freedom but the language of the 
Act, and then the ways in which it was translated into action, provides a powerful 
example of the historical process by which those flimsy boundaries could be drawn 
and redrawn. The seizure of Africans trapped aboard privately-owned slave ships 
became possible legally by defining them as contraband commodities rather than as 
kidnapped or trafficked peoples. Rescued Africans were taken as slaves. In this way, 
they could be confiscated to become property of the Crown. Once ‘condemned’ as 
Prize by the Vice-Admiralty Courts, however, in no circumstances were they to be 
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‘sold, disposed of, treated or dealt with as Slaves’. Thus, the act of condemnation 
explicitly negated the Africans’ status as illegally transported goods. Once impounded 
but not enslaved, officials were authorised to ‘enlist the same, or any of them, into His 
Majesty’s Land, or Sea Service, as Soldiers, Seamen, or Marines, or to bind the same 
or any of them, whether of full Age or not as Apprentices, for any Term not exceeding 
Fourteen Years’. 
The language of the Act paid careful attention to way in which this 
recalibration of identity and condition was to be enacted. It demanded that the 
Africans enter into these new relationships ‘as if’ they had done so voluntarily. 
Equally, any African recruited into the military was to be treated ‘as if he had 
voluntarily so enlisted’ except that the associated provisions to limit the length of 
service, or to provide a pension on discharge, did not apply.34 The form in which the 
rescue process is dramatised as a procedural narrative tries to have it both ways to the 
point that it is not freely given ‘consent’ but rather its performance that glosses the 
imperial instrumentalism that structured the activity in the first place. 
The 1808 Orders in Council added further practical guidance that drew 
boundaries in order to produce differentiated constituencies, and which further 
attempted to deal with the convergences between consent and coercion. Courts of 
Vice Admiralty were to be established at Freetown in Sierra Leone, and on several 
West Indian islands. Each colony’s Collector of Customs – dealers in contraband - 
was made responsible for administering the passage of the Africans into the armed 
forces or indentured servitude. If an African’s name was ‘unknown’, or not 
‘sufficiently easy, clear, and distinctive’, the Collectors were instructed to find 
another, and then to use that name thereafter until the individual was ‘sufficiently 
instructed for baptism’ whereupon that name would become official.35 Collectors 
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were instructed to do their utmost to reunite family members ‘except where the 
employment of either shall make such separation indispensible’.36 They were also 
instructed to assemble new families by encouraging those men enlisted to take 
rescued women as wives. These women would, insofar as it was possible, be 
permitted to live with their husbands, or to be indentured into domestic service 
nearby.  
When arrangements aimed at rationalizing the process were made by 
establishing a ‘recruiting depot’ in Freetown in 1811, the popular metropolitan 
equation of military coercion with slavery, coupled with the Sierra Leone 
controversies, meant that it was ‘highly necessary to bring the Military Service into 
repute by the encouragement of Voluntary Enlistment’. The encouragement took the 
form of using captives who spoke ‘African languages’ to ‘explain the advantages 
attending the situation of a British soldier’. A form of contractual bargain was 
introduced insofar as a ‘Bounty of Eight Guineas’ was to be paid to those who were 
enlisted. This sum was just over half the standard amount of fifteen guineas given to 
white soldiers ‘under the idea that such trifling articles of inducement more acceptable 
to the Negroes than Money, may be furnished.’37 Amongst the items requested for 
export to Sierra Leone for this purpose were 200 small looking glasses, 200 pounds of 
Common Beads, 30 cwt. of tobacco and one thousand ‘Snuff Boxes with a painted 
Portrait of a Black Soldier under Arms’.38  
Africans deemed unfit for enlistment were to be indentured to ‘prudent and 
humane masters and mistresses’ who had a reputation for treating their slaves with 
‘humanity’, to ‘learn such trades, handicrafts, or employments as they may seem most 
fit for’. Women were to be employed as domestic servants and not ‘the labours of 
Agriculture’ (a euphemism for field work). Bound servants were to be provided with 
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food, clothing, instructed in the Christian religion with a view to baptism, and 
permitted to attend church. Collectors were instructed to submit an annual report 
detailing all indentureships and their progress. If they were unable to produce an 
apprentice for inspection, they were liable for a fine: the amount payable would be 
equivalent to ‘double the sum at which an apprentice would be valued if to be sold as 
a slave’.39  
There was little interest in the kidnapped Africans who were being indentured 
in Caribbean until the controversies over the Registration Bills. In 1821, Wilberforce 
called for a Royal Commission of Inquiry to investigate the ‘state’ and ‘condition’ of 
these ‘Captured Negroes’ as the first indentures were reaching expiry and it was 
understood that rescued Africans were indeed being ‘seduced away from their 
employment’ in order to be sold as slaves.40 Given that the Abolition Act had not 
legislated for the period after the expiry of the indentures, the Commission’s findings 
would help determine the direction of colonial policy. More generally, the question 
underpinning the inquiry was whether the rescued Africans supported the 
abolitionists’ argument that Africans could, and indeed would, become civilised, 
colonial subjects willingly engaging in their labour. 
The Commission lasted for over five years and accounted for over 3,000 
kidnapped Africans in eight sugar colonies.41 While it is important to note that the 
findings do not relate directly to enslaved peoples in the colonies, the resulting mass 
of documents provide a vivid example of the ways in which political-economic 
considerations about labour discipline intensified and narrowed during the final phase 
of the anti-slavery campaigns. In particular, they illuminate the ways in which African 
identity came into question as a function of the need to know how to control a huge, 
racially identified, soon to be free, labour force. Significantly, the archive is not 
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simply expressive of the white control fantasy but constitutes evidence of the 
attempted enactment of it. In this sense, these documents do not simply provide a 
commentary on what happened, they need to be seen as part of the historical process. 
In the end, the assembled information was largely untranslatable into policy, 
despite its social scientific veneer, and its copious peripheral qualifications. In many 
ways, however, it is precisely the incoherent nature of the Commission that is most 
revealing insofar as it illuminates the discrepancies between abolitionism’s idealised 
representations and their distorted material outcomes. As the sheer mass of 
accumulated documents attests, the investigative process was neither orderly nor 
consistent. In fact their most expressive quality lies in the ways in which they give the 
lie to the idea that the exertion of colonial surveillance functioned to immobilise and 
fix subjects. Multiple, minutely detailed, and endlessly qualified instances in which 
the rescued Africans actively refused to recognise the terms of their rescue disrupt the 
tables, statistics, and columns designed to organise and affirm authoritative 
information. Hundreds of indentured Africans explained to the Commissioners how 
they fashioned their own lives either through necessity or through the desire for 
independence. They repeatedly spoke back, arguing that they were treated like slaves 
even though they were not enslaved. They demanded to know why they received no 
wages for their work – a demand that was invariably recorded as insolence, or 
insubordination. In this sense, the Commission, despite itself, documents the 
Africans’ own contributions to metropolitan debates about colonial subjecthood, 
servitude, and self-ownership. Their stories, or ‘enforced narratives’, forced 
comparisons between slavery and servitude, and the legal consequences of inhabiting 
one or other condition well before emancipation was even likely.42 
It is impossible to offer an extensive analysis here, so the purpose of the 
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following is to note how the desire for labour discipline actively produced highly 
contested understandings of colonial agency and aptitude. The documents provided 
evidence of the wide variety of bonded labouring contexts that existed within and 
alongside enslavement, and the imbrication of the imperial state in many of them, 
including Africans working as Crown slaves, military labourers or pioneers, hired out 
for gang labour by colonial Collectors, and indentured servants. Kidnapped Africans 
had been indentured amongst all strata of the free population, and were working in a 
wide variety of conditions both inside and outside of the plantation. Many had been 
put to fieldwork by planters accessing a new, and comparatively cheap, new source of 
labour. For example, while on Nevis the Commissioners found that George Forbes, 
one of the wealthiest planters, had taken twenty-nine apprenticed Africans, the 
majority of whom he had employed in ‘cane-holing’. The imminent arrival of the 
Commissioners prompted him quickly to remove them from the field with later 
assurances that he would now be employing them as tradesmen and domestics. 
Planters justified their actions by suggesting that being put to fieldwork functioned as 
a punishment for unruly behaviour. For example, Forbes’s indentured servant, John, 
was subjected to gang labour in the field because he had ‘quarreled and fought’ with 
staff in the house.43 Meanwhile, Wharton, employed as a cook in Antigua, whose 
‘honesty and sobriety’ had been called into question, was ‘sent into the country for 
improvement’.44  
Indentured Africans also worked on plantation as house servants, or in 
maintenance work. Others worked small provision grounds, growing food for 
themselves as well as for their employers. Most servants lived in urban or semi-urban 
situations, working in menial service or domestic situations. The division of labour 
was explicitly gendered: all female apprentices were employed as house servants, 
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cooks, washerwomen or seamstresses, while the men tended to work as porters, 
gardeners, or cleaners. Some were bound to coopers, carpenters, builders, cobblers or 
tailors, and others were employed as boatmen, fishermen, and mariners. The records 
show that when the indenture contract was with a tradesperson, often it did not 
include the training associated with an apprenticeship. Many Africans were engaged 
in such a variety of occupations both within and outside their contracts such that it 
was impossible to define their employment. 
Wealthy colonials employed large numbers of the apprentices in their 
households, or hired them out, which could be very lucrative.45 Merchants employed 
them to work on the docks and in transportation. Others were apprenticed to the free 
black, petty trading population. For example, Myrtilla was indentured to George Dix, 
a merchant, but on his death was transferred to Joseph Harrington, a ‘free coloured 
shoemaker’.46 Joan, also first indentured to Dix was had been transferred to Penelope 
Demming, ‘free coloured woman, laundress and baker.47 
Ascertaining the ‘Actual Condition’ of the Africans was inextricably linked to 
the Commissioners’ judgment of character and attitude, and they had very different 
interpretations of what they heard and saw. Overall, however, the reports reveal the 
disciplinary atmosphere of the Commission process while also exposing the 
contingent, and coercive, social contexts within which indentured servants existed.  
The attribution of ‘idleness’ was given to forms of conduct and behaviour that 
denoted an active refusal to submit to bonded service. Sustained attention to the 
mobility of the servants, many of whom absented themselves in search of temporary 
work, signalled a deep unease about a population unattached to employers and 
seemingly immune to time discipline. Whether it was by necessity or through the 
desire for independence, picking up casual work was invariably understood as 
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disloyalty, and as a failure to accept rank.  
The Africans had a variety of perceptions of the Commission. Some thought 
they were to be freed, and even those who had broken the terms of their indenture 
voluntarily appeared before the Commissioners. Others knew that, if they complained, 
their allegations would, or at least should, be investigated. For example, Forbes’s 
Antigua-based servants knew they were not supposed to be working in the field, and 
used the inquiry to voice their complaints. Mingo stated that he did ‘not like such 
work’ and Goodluck took the opportunity to say that ‘he would not work in the field 
with the hoe among the gang anymore’.48 As a result, colonials resented the arrival of 
the Commission, blaming it for their servants’ bad behaviour. Elizabeth Graham 
believed that the it had caused her servant, Charlotte’s, recent ‘impertinence’, which 
she thought had come from ‘bad advice’. The record states that Charlotte  
was a tolerable good character, till latterly, when she told her mistress, 
that if she chastised her, she would come and complain to the 
commissioners. She infers, from what she had heard in the chapel-
yard, from three African apprentices who were there, that the 
gentlemen had come out to take them away, on their complaint against 
their owners …49 
Thomas, domestic to J.P. Doan, a merchant, came back from St. Thomas to see the 
Commissioners in Tortola. Doan said that Thomas had stated that he had returned ‘to 
be made free’, which Thomas later denied. Thomas told the examiners that many of 
his countrymen had run away to St. Thomas again after their examination. The 
Commission records that Thomas had been imprisoned for vagrancy on his return, 
and was brought straight from jail to the Commission. He appeared to be a ‘violent 
and insubordinate character disposed to be insolent during his examination.’50 
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In many ways, the aims of the Commission were contradictory from the 
beginning. The officers were asked to report on the ‘state’ and ‘condition’ of the 
kidnapped Africans, and also on whether they could support themselves after their 
indenture had expired. The evidence that might have confirmed that possibility, for 
example if some Africans were indeed working for themselves, was also a violation of 
the contract of indenture. Signs of self-interested and acquisitive agency, so desired 
by abolitionists and the Colonial Office alike, were nearly always recorded as 
signifying disobedience, insubordination, unreliability, vagrancy, or idleness; the 
enactment of willing labour ‘elsewhere’ and for personal gain were read as the 
rejection of dutiful servility, and ingratitude.  
The final assessment of Major Thomas Moody, one of the first two 
Commissioners, stands out starkly from those of the other officers. Despite, or 
perhaps because of, his extreme position, his views had a significant impact in the 
metropole. As well as riling the abolitionists, Moody kept up a continuous dialogue 
with the Colonial Office, vigorously contesting the other reports verbally, by private 
correspondence, and in the papers.51 He refused to submit a joint report with his 
colleague, and relative by marriage, John Dougan. Dougan, a West Indian who had 
close connections to the Clapham Sect, was determined to view the indentured 
Africans through the lens of redemptive abolitionism that combined economic 
advance, moral uplift and imperial identification. He determinedly portrayed the 
Africans as malleable colonial subjects, reporting that ‘a desire to possess property of 
their own ha[d] been generally excited among them’. He expressed confidence that 
they would not rise up after they were released from their bonds because they would 
have a particular loyalty to the British greater even than manumitted slaves. He wrote 
optimistically, ‘knowing the great ransom that has been paid for them, they must feel 
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a greater obligation than those who have purchased their own freedom’.52  
The second two Commissioners, Gannon and Bowles, had also disagreed to 
the point of violence between them.53 Gannon submitted his own report in which he 
took a more utilitarian approach to the issue of voluntary labour. He viewed the 
Africans as persons who ‘could acquire their livelihood … by their own industry and 
good conduct if no obstacles were to be placed in the way of their exertions’. 
Referencing his experience in Antigua, he criticised the institutional arrangements for 
housing unplaced or unbonded Africans. The ‘Hospital Establishments’ hindered the 
‘moral progress’ of the Africans because they were hired out in ‘irregular gangs’ 
which prevented the development of ‘habits of regular or useful industry’.54 Gannon 
also observed that it was remarkable that ‘all those Africans whose apprenticeships 
had terminated, preferred the privileges of being allowed to seek their own 
subsistence, to remaining any longer in the service of their masters and mistresses.’ 
He glossed the observation, however, by assuming that they would not do so for long 
if ‘freedom’ was accompanied with a ‘precarious mode of living’. 55  
The third set of Commissioners examined a small group of indentured servants 
in Demerara, the majority of whom were Barbadians who had been illegally imported 
into the colony. Like all the other Commissioners, Burdett and Kinchella 
acknowledged that the servants would not work voluntarily in agriculture, ‘the most 
laborious of all occupations’. In their view the creoles were much improved by their 
‘constant intercourse with Europeans’. For the servants themselves, their terms of 
service or employment were far less important than their ‘strong desire’ to be returned 
to Barbados in order to be reunited with their families.56 
Major Moody submitted two reports, each of which ran to hundreds of 
pages.57 He had a ‘philosophy of labour’ through which he saw himself as a ‘practical 
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philanthropist’.58 Deploying his knowledge of engineering and colonial surveying, 
indebted historically to the vicious, and colonially applied, ‘political arithmetic’ of 
William Petty, Moody took the opportunity not only to attack the abolitionists’ 
naiveté over the future of the plantations but to offer his own remedies.  
Moody was well versed in abolitionist literature, noting that Stephen’s 
recommendation of a period of indenture in 1802 had been reworked for the Act for 
the Abolition of the Slave Trade, and for the Orders in Council.59 He believed that the 
scheme had been irredeemably flawed in dictating that rescued Africans, who were 
‘in a backward state of knowledge’, be exempt from plantation labour.60 He argued 
from the basis of the ‘physical fact’ that only blacks were suited to hard agricultural 
labour in the ‘torrid zone’, and that the pressing issue was how ‘capitalists’ would be 
able to extract ‘steady’ and ‘continuous labour’ if not under conditions of 
enslavement.61 Moody endlessly reiterated the fundamental necessity of ‘some degree 
of coercion’ to ensure ‘steadiness’.62 He argued that many of the problems in Tortola 
(where he had been a Commissioner) stemmed from the fact that the island was too 
poor to afford a police force, or a treadmill. Moody’s solution to the problem of West 
Indian labour combined eighteenth century climatological theory, Scottish 
Enlightenment theories of history, and the scientific theories of modern physics. He 
was enamoured with Charles-Augustin de Coulomb, who, in his early career, had 
been a military engineer in Martinique, in charge of thousands of African slaves who 
were employed in building the island’s fortifications.63 Today, Coulomb is 
remembered for lending his name to a measure of electric charge. It is less noted that 
he also used his colonial experience to develop a scientific theory of human labour 
power, defining ‘work’ as ‘the product of thrust multiplied by the speed and length of 
the effort exerted’.64 
 147 
Moody had studied a wide variety of projects that utilised coerced labour. He 
was fascinated by post-revolutionary Haiti’s labour codes set out by Toussaint and 
Christophe, and in President Boyer’s 1818 invitation to freed African Americans to 
emigrate to Haiti under certain stipulations.65 He thought Johannes van den Bosch’s 
Dutch agricultural colonies for the criminalised poor might provide a model for the 
West Indies, although he was troubled by Bosch’s inattention to religious instruction, 
as it ‘was necessary to have some strong moral power over [the labourer’s] mind’.66  
Moody’s plans reflected the understanding of the valuation of people 
understood only in terms of their labour power first developed as early modern 
political arithmetic and that understanding could also be extracted, and abstracted, 
from the general thrust of contemporary political economy. If human value was 
calibrated in this way then people were eminently portable thus signalling the 
relations between contemporary emigration and indenture schemes, convict 
transportation, and colonial production as Clare Anderson argues in her chapter. 
Moody advised that the indentured Africans be extracted from the colonies, and taken 
back to West Africa, suggesting that an island off the coast would be most appropriate 
setting. He reasoned that an island, ‘and particularly a small one, renders it more 
difficult for any of the inhabitants clandestinely to withdraw themselves in the first 
stage of their cultivation’.67 The plan was a way to ensure that the rescued African 
would be ‘forced to experience the advantages resulting from the enjoyment of wealth 
to be created by his own labour’.68 
Moody’s crude theorising was bizarrely constructed by layering random 
scholarly reference upon reference as if this method would somehow secure his 
argument. Nevertheless, his yoking together of racial hatred, instrumental reasoning, 
and the assumed authority of long years of military experience in the West Indies, 
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meant that his thinking did not fall on deaf ears. Bathurst was interested in Moody’s 
ideas but knew that they were incendiary. Bathurst’s under secretary, Wilmot Horton, 
had sympathy with the racial basis of Moody’s plans, as is clear in their extensive 
private correspondence about the indentured Africans. Moody was not a member of 
the intellectual elite but he was able to move between factions of the establishment 
due to his military standing and colonial experience. He was a member of London’s 
new Political Economy Club, arguing his cause with Mill, disagreeing with 
McCulloch, and impressed by Jean-Baptiste Say’s commitment to facts.69 Moody 
insisted that one had to argue from local experience, and the problem with political 
economy was its focus on production rather than on the specificities of labour. As he 
complained to Horton, ‘All have followed Adam Smith’s assumption that the desire to 
better their condition has been the sole stimulus to labour’, arguing that the ‘principle 
of necessity’ acts universally on all men but the ‘desire of bettering one’s own 
condition’ requires much more careful consideration that required an attention to 
‘local, physical, and moral nature’.70  
Moody’s ideas about the necessity of coercion if labour was to be ‘steady’, 
‘regular’ and ordered were not, of course, novel, although his method of reaching 
them was bizarre. The problem of producing the self-discipline required by a free 
wage labour economy was a key issue for early nineteenth century reformist 
governance both at home as well as in the colonies.71 The ability of theoretical 
political economy to accomplish its scientific ends always required an attention to the 
specificities of cultural reproduction despite its claims to universalism. That the 
failure to conform to the requirements of free labour should elicit new ‘scientific’ 
narratives of racial as well as cultural inadequacy is well established but most often 
attributed to the post-emancipation period in the Caribbean, and to Ireland. Horton, 
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who was deeply interested in political economy, listened carefully to Moody. In 1824, 
he sent one of Moody’s papers to Canning writing,  
…it is not to be forgotten that the nature of the African is to be 
indolent inasmuch as his wants are few and those almost spontaneously 
satisfied in the climate under which he lives – No adage can be more 
trite in political economy than that which points out the connection of 
Exertion with Climate & which would enable a person “ a priori” to 
pronounce in the probable industry of a nation from the mere 
knowledge of that physical circumstance. This condition would 
necessarily be modified by density of population, circumstances of 
civilization but still the principle is true and valuable.72 
Moody’s plan to expropriate the Africans once again, and to return them to a 
remote island off the West coast of Africa, was not enacted. In October 1828, colonial 
governors were directed to issue certificates of freedom to all Africans no longer, or 
not, indentured. These certificates still contained the stick of coercion and the threat 
of criminal prosecution if labour expectations were not met. For a further seven years 
the right to remain in place was secure as long as the bearer’s ‘Conduct merits this 
Indulgence’. If found to have engaged in criminal activity, or simply become 
dependent on poor relief, ‘free’ Africans were liable to be transported, and to be 
‘constrained to labour for [their] Subsistence’.73 
The Commission records are not an archive that commemorates the enslaved 
but it is one that documents something of the experience of unenslaved ‘captives’ 
forced to inhabit in a slave society. Ironically, their significance might lie precisely in 
the fact that they have been almost entirely ignored. Royal Commissions traditionally 
take privileged positions in shaping received historical chronologies, in crystallising 
 150 
the significance of certain events or conjunctures, and in monumentalising the 
imperial past but this one has no place in the scholarship to date. It is not simply the 
constraints of narrative form that ensures that historical outcomes, and only certain 
outcomes, are deemed to be more important than an examination of the historical 
processes through which they are produced. 
Assimilating the kidnapped Africans stranded in the Caribbean in the late 
1820s, neither enslaved nor free, into the powerful story that insists that all history is 
written as a prelude to freedom might ensure that they become, at least, footnotes, or 
at best intermediaries. Yet, they also disrupt that story by drawing attention to a 
deeper set of historical continuities and convergences in a wider imperial reallocation 
of colonial labour within which Caribbean emancipation was implicated but which it 
did not completely define. As David Lloyd argues in another context, ‘for the 
materialist cultural historian, the actual outcome of multiple social vectors is less 
important than the swirling eddies of possibility out of which that outcome 
emerged’.74 The 1821 Commission registers a significant moment in slavery’s 
undoing, illuminating the continuing and uneven imbrication of the extraordinarily 
powerful discourses of moral sentiment and political economy in the effort to 
configure alternatives to colonial enslavement. The fact that the abolitionists kept the 
ideal of ‘free labour’ in view needs to be acknowledged at the same time as subjecting 
the concept to critical historical analyses that highlight its ideological interests and 
political investments. The Commission records discussed here offer an insight into the 
construction of a modern racialised division of labour, of which slavery was a 
momentous part, that shaped, and continues to shape, the ongoing violence associated 
with imperial power today. 
Despite all the evidence elicited by this Commission, the 1807 Act to Abolish 
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the Slave Trade resurrected an ancient form of bonded labour contract (that had 
preceded Caribbean enslavement) that came to pass for the ‘emancipation’ of all the 
enslaved in 1833 and which would be extended to capture other colonial 
constituencies thereafter. Tens of thousands of ‘Liberated Africans’ continued to be 
shipped across the Atlantic, as indentured servants, to replenish the plantations until 
the 1860s. Both of these episodes allude to the ruptures and continuities that render 
this history incomplete. Finally, however important it is to acknowledge the centrality 
of political economy to the shaping of the 1833 emancipation - Richard Madden 
insisted, by this time, its terms could be understood as a form of ‘common sense’ - the 
intensity of interest in labour management, discipline, and efficiency formulas is a 
reminder of the extent to which the categories that emerged from the economic 
imperative could only develop due to an enormous blind-spot in metropolitan thought. 
That the ideas, desires, and motives of Africans and their descendants were 
themselves elements in the historical process was unconscionable for both 
slaveholders and their critics. It is precisely because these elements were repressed, 
those with power were able to invent extraordinarily durable ideas about the sovereign 
power of the market, the waged character of free labour, and about how one calibrates 
racial or cultural inadequacy all of which have taken on an even harder veneer in the 
contemporary neoliberal order. 
The issue such silence, of what is not there, has functioned as a powerful 
postcolonial anchor around which to engage the problems of excavating an archive 
shaped by the developers of political economy. But perhaps we should be wary of 
giving it too much space given the bureaucratic assiduousness of Britain’s imperial 
machine. To reiterate a point made earlier, the Commission records addressed here do 
not commemorate slavery, and they only came into being through imperial efforts to 
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find a script for the end of slavery. They bear witness, however, to the fact that 
forcibly transported Africans arriving in the Caribbean prior to 1833, under the 
auspices of the British Navy rather than the slave traders, represented their own lives, 
and figured freedom in ways that pointed beyond, beside, and outside the confines of 
those incarcerating narratives. 
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